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meaningful comparison of Stevin with his contemporaries. For me this was especially a problem in the chapter on
algebra (like any reader, I paid particular attention to my favourite topic), which claims that Stevin formed a link
between the Italian algebraists of the early 16th century and the great French innovators of the second half of the
century and beyond. It is true that Stevin read, admired, and re-worked the algebra of Bombelli, who in turn had learned
from Cardano. To suggest, however, that Cardano merely ‘summarized the knowledge of the day, chiefly derived from
Arab mathematicians’ (p. 181) is to overlook Cardano’s far-reaching innovations, which set the algebraic agenda for
decades. Stevin certainly helped to clarify that agenda, but to claim, as the authors do, that he was a profound influence
on Viète or Descartes is to overstep the bounds of historical evidence. It seems to me unlikely that Viète ever read
Stevin, and if he did so he ignored his notation, which was actually much clearer and easier than anything Viète
produced. Descartes was inclined to deny having read any of his predecessors, but in any case wrote some 50 years
after Stevin and in a very different intellectual climate.
This book will certainly serve the purpose of introducing Stevin and his work to a broad non-specialist public,
which is probably what its authors most had in mind. To historians, however, it is likely to be something of a dis-
appointment. Lists of facts, however extensive, are no substitute for proper historical context. Further, the authors’
slightly naïve attempts to claim priority and superiority for Stevin do not in the end do him as much justice as would
a more critical analysis of his role in the mathematical sciences of the late 16th and early 17th centuries. Stevin was
a prolific and inventive mathematical practitioner, as this book so often shows, and he does not need to be placed on
artificially constructed pedestals.
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By Raffaele Cirino. Soveria Mannelli (Rubbettino). 2006. ISBN 88 498 1593-X. 310 pp.€15
In a well-known letter to Samuel Masson, written in 1716, Leibniz turns to a question which was of central impor-
tance to him throughout his intellectual career: the mathematization of nature. In applying mathematics to the physical
world, his infinitesimal calculus is, he suggests, extremely useful. Nevertheless, he finds it important to distinguish
scientific and metaphysical explanation and emphasizes that he does not seek to give an account of the nature of things
by means of his calculus. To back this up he points out that infinitesimal quantities are on his view not part of the
make up of this world but simply useful fictions.
Elsewhere in the Leibnizian corpus there are of course somewhat different accounts of the nature of these quantities,
but the letter to Masson is nevertheless instructive. Infinitesimals were consistently seen by Leibniz as theoretical
mediators between the mathematical, the physical, and beyond this also the metaphysical world. As such, they serve
to bridge traditional divides in our reading of his thought; divides which in many ways are at odds with the true
intentions of the German mathematician and philosopher, who never ceases to point out the interrelations between the
diverse fields in which he worked.
Part of the task which Raffaele Cirino undertakes in Dal movimento alla forza is to illuminate precisely this me-
diating function of infinitesimal quantities and at the same time to show that the calculus, which itself profited from
Leibniz’s work on logic and symbols, contributed to the structural development of his metaphysics (p. 16). This is
the idea behind the somewhat intriguing subtitle “l’infinitesimo tra logica e metafisica.” Cirino rejects quite explicitly
the view that the development of Leibniz’s calculus can be explained along purely internalistic lines. On his view the
infinitesimal sits squarely between logic and metaphysics (p. 17).
Cirino begins his investigation by considering the work of three of the most influential authors on Leibniz at
the beginning of the 20th century, namely Bertrand Russell, Louis Couturat, and Ernst Cassirer. This might seem a
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rather dated way of approaching Leibniz a century later, but there is a certain justification to the extent that all three
ascribed a central role to logic, and in part also to mathematics, in understanding Leibniz’s system—although Russell
initially failed to recognize possible influences that his mathematical work might have had on the development of the
doctrine of monads. Their failings arose, on Cirino’s opinion, because they largely ignored questions of the historical
development of Leibniz’s thought. If Russell, Couturat, and Cassirer represented a renaissance in Leibniz scholarship,
it was a “renaissance without history.”
It is, on Cirino’s view, by following a “timeless” or “purely philosophical” approach to Leibniz that Russell reaches
his main conclusion that the metaphysical theory of monads can be derived from subject-predicate logic. While he
readily accepts that the parallelism between logic and metaphysics, and thus between knowledge and being is at the
core of Leibniz’s system, Cirino nevertheless finds that Russell’s approach tends to destroy precisely the bridge be-
tween dynamics and metaphysics that the calculus provides (p. 37). This is reflected in the English philosopher’s
discussion of the relativity of motion, which as he recognizes provides Leibniz with one of his strongest arguments in
support of the concept of force. But it is, on Russell’s view, an argument that collapses under the weight of contradic-
tion, thus severing any supposed connection between dynamics and metaphysics (p. 44).
As Cirino explains, Russell found confirmation of his central thesis in Couturat’s La logique de Leibniz (1901),
which the latter wrote on the basis of his investigations on Leibniz’s manuscripts in the then Royal Library in Hanover.
Through this book Russell also became aware for the first time of Couturat’s thesis that mathematics, and especially
the infinitesimal calculus, had exerted a profound influence on Leibniz’s philosophy. By the time he came to publish
the second edition of his Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz in 1937, he had met Peano in Paris and
studied the work of Frege. Both of these authors prompted him to reassess his earlier conclusions on Leibniz.
Against the background of an intellectual tradition in which historians of philosophy focused on Leibniz’s meta-
physics and historians of mathematics focused on his invention of differential an integral calculus, Couturat was able
to claim with justification that logic was the most neglected part of Leibniz’s system. Indeed, traditionally little time
was devoted to the importance of mathematical method or to the application of algebra to logic (p. 49). While agreeing
with Couturat on this count, the author rejects his attempt to derive Leibniz’s physics and above all his metaphysics
from a common logical matrix since on his view this falsifies the inner relation between necessity and contingency,
the abstract and the real. In effect, the metaphysical principle of sufficient reason is reduced to the logical principle
of identity or contradiction (p. 63f). It is, he correctly suggests, not a question of derivation at all, but rather one of
application. Abstract mathematics is the true logic of natural science and the true method of physics consists in the
application of mathematics to nature (p. 56). But Cirino is surely too restrictive when he writes that the application
of “mathematical laws” to physics can only occur by means of the concept of infinitesimal, and he is plainly wrong
in suggesting that mathematics when applied to the contingent “loses some of its purity and becomes less rigorous”
(p. 58). The key to Leibniz’s employment of infinitesimals and indeed to the application of mathematics in general
is the concept of negligible error. Rigor is not compromised in this respect, because higher degrees of exactness
can always be obtained if required; the decisive criterion as in so much early modern science and mathematics is
usefulness.
Although Cassirer in Leibniz’ System in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen also takes the foundation of math-
ematics in Leibniz to lie in the identity principle, he recognizes, as Cirino makes clear, that infinite divisibility of the
continuum, and not logic, provides the key to understanding how mathematics is applied to physics. The author backs
this up by citing a letter to Foucher written in 1701, in which Leibniz points out that although he does not conceive
physical indivisibles to exist, he nevertheless believes that nature’s processes occur to any degree of smallness that
geometry cares to consider. In other words, the applicability of the calculus to our understanding of phenomena is
seen to reflect the infinity that goes to the very core of natural structures. In view of this Cirino sees the infinitesimal
as representing the true mediator between the principles of logic and reality, between “the mental scheme” and natural
phenomena (p. 72).
The author proceeds to discuss the divisibility of the continuum and its relation to the actual division of matter in
Leibniz. Referring to Leibniz’s early dialogue Pacidius Philalethi (1676) he correctly points out that just as there can
be no smallest magnitude or largest number, so, too, can there be no minimal quantitative part in matter or greatest
velocity in motion (p. 106). Furthermore the mathematical demonstration that point is not part of a straight line or
segment is seen to have great importance for the later development of the theory of monads (p. 108). While this is
undoubtedly true, it is not particularly new. Nor does the author provide any detailed textual analysis to show how
Leibniz’s early deliberations on the nature of the continuum played a role in the evolution of his later thought. Despite
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the author’s criticisms of Russell, Couturat, and Cassirer we are provided more with a juxtaposition of textual passages
than a precise account of historical developments. This is all the more surprising as many of the texts documenting
Leibniz’s philosophical and mathematical development in the period under discussion have now been published in the
Akademie-Ausgabe.
This problem is reflected in some of the assertions Cirino makes on the emergence of the mathematical concept of
the infinitesimal in Paris. While it is certainly correct that the philosophical ideas on indivisibles that Leibniz worked
out in Mainz laid the foundation for the mathematical concept, it is all too easy simply to claim that the former led
to the latter (p. 206). Admittedly, the author suggests that Leibniz received decisive impulses through reading the
mathematical work of John Wallis, but this is surely mistaken. By the time Leibniz came to read Wallis in Paris,
he had already developed his concept of infinitesimal and was indeed extremely critical of Wallis’s employment of
interpolation and what the Oxford mathematician called induction. The only significant praise he now gave to Wallis
in a mathematical context was on account of his having arithmetized the method of Cavalieri. As far as infinitesimals
are concerned, Leibniz’s concept is quite different from that of the infinitely small in Wallis, who employed these
indivisible elements in a strictly compositional sense in works such as De sectionibus conicis and Arithmetica infinito-
rum (see p. 212). Similarly, it is by no means clear, as Cirino suggests, that metaphysical deliberations on infinity had
any decisive impact on the formulation of mathematical ideas (p. 259f). Leibniz repeatedly asserted that questions on
the nature of infinity were for metaphysicians to discuss, not for mathematicians whose approach is altogether more
utilitarian in nature.
The author is on firmer ground when talking about metaphysics and the passage from motion to force. He discusses
the role played by final causes in Leibniz’s work on optics (p. 125), and his establishment of the law of the equivalence
between the full cause and the complete effect in contrast to Descartes’s principle of the conservation of motion
(p. 136). Moreover, by seeing the concept of substantial form from a dynamical point of view, Leibniz was able to
pass to a quantitative measure of force, relative to its effect, from the estimation of its proximate cause as a single
qualitative element. In this respect, the author correctly ascribes the infinitesimal calculus a central role, since it
serves as a methodological vehicle that describes the minimal mechanism of motion and as such is able to lead us
from motion to force, and thus to the simple substance concept at the core of Leibniz’s metaphysics (p. 139). It is
here that the insufficiency of Couturat’s interpretation becomes apparent on Cirino’s view. The true mathematics, to
which Leibniz refers, through which the concept of force is considered, is that of infinitesimals. And this does not
correspond, as Cirino believes he has shown, to a rigorous logic of the formal kind, but pertains rather to metaphysics
and the logic or probability (pp. 148, 183, 289).
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Graßmann
By Hans-Joachim Petsche. Basel, Boston, Berlin (Birkhäuser). 2006. ISBN 978-3-7643-7257-6. 326 pp. $89.95
Grassmann, one the mathematical geniuses of the nineteenth century, among his many accomplishments estab-
lished linear algebra with his Ausdehnungslehre, or calculus of extension, of 1844. His work on the latter was largely
overlooked during his lifetime because it was ahead of its time and presented in a way that contemporaries found
difficult to follow. The unclear cause of this difficulty, coupled with the dramatic description some later commentators
gave of Grassmann’s suffering from rejection, were major appeals for making the 1844 Ausdehnungslehre the sub-
ject of my 1975 doctoral thesis. Until the appearance of the present book by Petsche, based on his 1979 dissertation,
I was unaware that anyone else was also attracted to this topic in the 1970s. The international group of historians of
mathematics was not that large and I knew many of the members of that group in Germany, at least in West Germany.
